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Summary 
 
The field of direct taxation is not fully harmonised on the European Union level and 
falls mainly within the competence of the Member States.1 Nevertheless it still becomes 
a subject of limitation and scrutiny of fundamental freedoms and principles established 
by the treaties and the CJEU case law. Non-discrimination became undoubtedly a 
cornerstone for further integration and legal development. Although originally it has 
been intended as an absolute principle, with time the CJEU demonstrated that under 
specific conditions discriminatory and restrictive treatment might be allowed when 
justified. However in recent years a new factor appeared to gain more in depth 
consideration and importance, namely the neutralisation of discrimination. 
Neutralisation, despite continuous appearance in the case law has not yet been clearly 
defined or evaluated in terms of its legal status.  
 
Firstly, this work presents one of the possible perspectives of understanding the 
concept, what meaning it has in relation to the non-discrimination principle and how it 
might be placed within the EU legal order.  
Secondly, it evaluates circumstances under which neutralisation might occur: at the 
current stage of the case law two prime type situations have been examined: the purely 
domestic context when a discriminatory treatment is intended to be neutralised by 
another tax regulation (mostly by so called ‘opt in’ provisions) on a national level, while 
the second type involves a cross-border context and the application of a double tax 
conventions between Member States.  
Thirdly, this work points out the differences in the analysis and reasoning provided by 
the CJEU, suggesting that the more liberal approach (in comparison to the ‘opt in’ 
provisions) is given in situations involving tax treaties, where at least two Member 
States are involved and it is the action of another contracting Member State that 
neutralises the discriminatory treatment. This aspect will be seen from the perspective 
and the role of tax treaties and will aim at reconciling them with EU law.  
 
Finally, it also suggests the need of more coherent consideration towards the 
neutralising provision for securing the legal certainty and legitimate expectations of 
taxpayers. It will also investigate potential future consequences that might need further 
evaluation as expanding the application of neutralising provisions may bring more 
possible risks that are not in accordance with EU objectives.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
1 Judgement in Royal Bank of Scotland, C-311/97, ECLI:EU:C:1999:216, para 19.  
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1. Introduction 
 
1.1. Background  
 
The concept of neutralisation is inherently linked to the principle of non-discrimination. 
Within the EU framework the analysis requires the existence of two situations that are 
treated differently, even though they are comparable and they result in a less favourable 
treatment for one of the subjects of the evaluation.2 The field of “direct taxation does 
not as such fall within the purview of the Community, the powers retained by the 
Member States must nevertheless be exercised consistently with Community law”.3 In 
the present scenario we will consider the domestic legislation and tax treaties concluded 
between Member States and whether discrimination arising from the application of tax 
legislation can be neutralised by any alternative provisions.  
 
The discussion over neutralisation is a complex task, not only it involves the 
examination of the non-discriminatory principle which is also incorporated into 
fundamental freedoms, but also the understanding of the role and functions of bilateral 
tax treaties and their interaction with the EU legal order and other domestic sources of 
law. Through years the CJEU slowly yet significantly modified its approach towards 
legislation that might discriminate: from the absolute prohibition towards the allowance 
of various justifications and subject to proportionality.  
 
Soon however, the possibility of justification of a discriminatory treatment was also 
recognised and introduced - for the purpose of the analysis of neutralisation the  
relevant justification is the cohesion of the tax system.4 As the idea of maintaining the 
existing tax regime might take the priority over the discriminatory provisions does not 
leave a straightforward guidance as to in which situations it is applicable and potentially 
upheld, on many occasions it has confirmed the complexity of a multilevel relation 
between EU law and domestic rules. Involvement of tax treaties only added to such 
ramification.  
 
As the Wielockx case5 illustrated, the cohesion principle once secured by bilateral 
conventions cannot be later invoked by a Member State to justify the discriminatory 
treatment.6 However it was not until the decision in Bouanich7 when the relationship 
between income tax treaties and domestic rules was in depth explained, and suggested 
how, potentially, the former could deliver a better result than purely national legislation. 
By evaluation of the interplay between various sources of law it broached the subject 
that in fact tax treaties might heal or balance out potential restrictions over fundamental 
                                                
2 Niels Bammens, The principle of Non-Discrimination in international and European tax law (IBFD 
2012) p 9. 
3 Judgement in Schumacker, C-279/93, ECLI:EU:C:1995:31, para 21. 
4 The cohesion of tax system was firstly introduced in the judgment in Bachman, C-204/90, 
ECLI:EU:C:1992:35, however it was consequently narrowed down in subsequent cases, see further ex-
planation in Pasquale Pistone, The Impact of Community Law on Tax Treaties: Issues and Solutions, (Eu-
rotax, Kluwer Law International 2002) p 44. 
5 Judgement in Wielockx, C-80/94, ECLI:EU:C:1995:271. 
6 Ibidem, para 24-25.  
7 Judgement in Bouanich, C-265/04, ECLI:EU:C:2006:51.  
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freedoms and therefore could offer a form of a compensatory treatment for 
discrimination.8 In other words, it created the base for the concept of neutralisation.  
 
1.2. Subject and purpose 
As the discussed subject interacts closely with other fundamental concepts of EU law 
and therefore cannot be examined in an isolated manner. Although it is not as often 
examined, it consistently creates difficulties for the CJEU to balance various interests of 
the EU obligations and Member States’ power to regulate the field of direct taxation. 
Therefore the subject is aimed to show the consistency (if any) in its applicability, 
synergy of domestic law and tax treaties towards EU law and the obligation of non-
discriminatory treatment. In other words the intention is to present a study that would be 
more than merely an overview, as it seeks to answer questions as to the existence, 
understanding and purpose of the concept of neutralisation, its interaction with domestic 
laws and tax treaties, relevance for the non-discrimination principle and application 
within EU legal framework.  
If all of the above can be successfully established and evaluated then they would 
essentially lead to the answer whether the concept of neutralisation is compatible with 
EU law and if so, how such compatibility is achieved. Concluding remarks additionally 
present potential difficulties and questions that might need to be answered in the future, 
as the concept of neutralisation is still a developing idea without clearly defined 
application.  
1.3. Method and materials 
In order to answer the legal questions presented in this work the traditional legal method 
will be used as the ultimate purpose relates to the law as it stands today and according to 
the existing case law.9 Sources of law such as treaties, CJEU case law, where relevant 
the national legislation and tax treaties will be mention, however always within the 
context of the EU case law. Additionally for further clarification also the Advocates’ 
General opinions might be brought for the purpose of the analysis, despite the fact that 
those do not form a part of law in itself. Nevertheless, they are a useful and valuable 
insight into the mechanism of Union’s law as in certain cases they evaluated the issue of 
neutralisation in more depth than the CJEU was willing to do. Many times in fact it is 
Advocates’ General opinions that provide more detailed analysis and evaluate the 
problem of neutralisation in a broader perspective, for instance in connection to 
discrimination or impossibility of justification.10 
To some extent articles and research of scholars and academics might be also validated 
to provide a valuable theoretical background and commentary in relation to the outcome 
and consequences of the selected case law. It is also relevant to see whether already 
decided cases nevertheless lead to uncertainty and how future difficulties are being 
predicted by academics and practitioners.  
                                                
8 Tom O’Shea, “Spain’s Dividend Taxation Rules Breach EU Law”, Tax Notes International  (2010, 
vol.59, no. 3) p 188. 
9 Mike McConville and Wing Hong Chui, Research Methods for Law (Edinburgh University Press 2007) 
p 8.  
10 See for instance Advocate General opinion in Gielen, C-440/08, ECLI:EU:C:2009:661 or Advocate 
General opinion in Amurta, C-379/05, ECLI:EU:C:2007:323. 
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Where necessary certain comparative elements might be also introduced in order to 
emphasise similarities and differences in the application of neutralisation within the 
context of domestic ‘opt in’ clauses and tax treaties. Such comparison might also help 
in answering the question as to whether neutralisation in compatible with EU law.  
1.4. Delimitation 
Albeit the given subject touches upon very broad and comprehensive factors of EU law 
such as non-discrimination principle, fundamental freedoms, the role of tax treaties 
(among others) those will be only discussed in a direct connection to the concept of 
neutralisation.  
 
Firstly, the work will be limited to the field of EU law only and doctrines relevant for 
the CJEU case analysis, therefore the OECD non-discriminatory guidance will not be 
analysed, nor will be the role of tax treaties in the international tax law. As the primary 
aim is to place the concept of neutralisation within the EU law composition and  to 
examine its compatibility the author sees more need for the consistency of the sources 
and area of research. For the same reason also the Fokus Bank case11 will be discussed 
very briefly, only to present the contrast between the CJEU and the EFTA Court. As the 
topic only recently received more detailed attention and coherent understanding the 
author prefers to avoid the risk of too broad and extensive scope of analysis. It has to be 
however acknowledged that in the future it might be of a great value to compare the EU 
and international approaches. 
 
Secondly, only several selected cases will be given a more in-depth review. The reason 
for such selectivity is to provide clear examples that will illustrate relevant similarities 
and differences that are important for determining the CJEU reasoning.  The cases that 
have been selected for this work represent only a part of all available resources in 
relation to neutralisation. However in the author’s opinion they illustrate the evolution 
in the approach, provide clear understanding of the Court’s reasoning and demonstrate  
key aspects for the approval (or rejection) of neutralisation. The author is aware of the 
existence of other cases, especially in relation to tax treaties, but it is believed that the 
selected choice represents the fundamental knowledge and is used by the CJEU in 
subsequent cases to reaffirm its position. Equally, it would be possible to present the 
issue of neutralisation in more detail only regarding tax treaty application, but the work 
would suffer on the part involving domestic situation, which clearly present an 
interesting and valuable contrast. 
 
1.5. Outline 
 
This work has been divided into sections that approach different aspects of 
neutralisation, chapter 2 will serve the purpose of introducing the concept and how it is 
connected to other principles of EU law and how it is relevant for this study. Chapter 3 
mainly analyses the case law concerned with the “opt in” clauses in the domestic legal 
systems that are intended to neutralise discrimination. Further in chapter 4 this position 
will be contrasted with the evolution and application of the concept in tax treaties. 
Chapter 5 brings out the questions as to the consistency of in the application of 
neutralisation and subsequently in chapter 6 the potential consequences for such 
                                                
11 Judgement in Fokus Bank, E-1/04. 
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situation are highlighted. Chapter 7 presents general difficulties that arise with various 
aspects of the concept in order to fulfil the aim of the analysis. Finally, chapter 8 
provides final conclusions and remarks, which summarise the efforts undertaken in this 
paper. 
 
 
2. The concept of neutralisation 
 
 
2.1. The meaning of neutralisation 
 
Neutralisation of discrimination in the EU tax has been mentioned both in the ECJ case 
law, and to certain extent, in academics’ writings. Nevertheless it has yet not received a 
more detailed analysis and therefore the primary aim is to explain the concept and 
evaluate potential difficulties related to the topic.  
 
The very basic problem lies in the lack of a legal definition of the concept of 
neutralisation. Additionally, there is no agreement between scholars as to the function 
of neutralisation: some see it as a new ground for justification; others prefer to discuss it 
as a form of compensation. Moreover, as this work will further present and explain, the 
same concept is used is various situations and the reasoning behind such different 
application also varies significantly. As indicated before, part of the academic 
environment see neutralisation as a form of compensation (and this position will be also 
adapted in this work for reasons explained below), others propose neutralisation to 
become a new justification ground.12 Due to those differences, it is appropriate to 
establish a basic line for further understanding. As the Court never went into many 
details to explain what exactly should be understood as neutralisation, the concept 
naturally raises questions and different opinions. However, as stated in the case of 
Commission v Italy13 and later also repeated in Commission v Spain,14 neutralisation 
may arise when the difference in treatment resulting from the application of national 
legislation can be compensated for, by applying provision of the double taxation 
convention. It seems there is a substantial difference between the meaning of 
compensation and justification. While justification reaffirms reasonableness behind 
action taken or explains reasons why certain treatment might exist, neutralisation 
compensates for unequal treatment.  
 
According to the Oxford Dictionary “to neutralise” means “to counterbalance or 
counteract the effect, to render ineffective or to make something ineffective” by 
applying an opposite force or effect.15 If we attempt to transfer this common meaning 
into the legal field we would reach to the understanding that neutralising provisions aim 
at making discriminatory legislation ineffective. However it is key to notice that it does 
not remove the discriminatory regime.16 The neutralisation can appear in two contexts: 
                                                
12 Edited by Michael Lang, Pasquale Pistone, Josef Schuch, Claus Staringer, Introduction to European 
Tax Law: Direct Taxation, (Spiramus 2012, 3rd ed) p 77.  
13 Judgement in Commission v Italy, C-540/07, ECLI:EU:C:2009:717, para 38. 
14 Judgement in Commission v Spain, C- 487/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:310, para 62. 
15 Oxford Dictionary, available online: http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/neutralize , 
last accessed on 15th April 2014.  
16 Bammens, supra note 2, p 907.  
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first, in purely domestic situation, mostly under so called ‘opt in’ clauses when the 
taxpayer could voluntarily to opt for a parallel method of taxation (usually the situation 
refers to non-residents who wish to be taxed as residents in order to receive allowances, 
the right of deduction, etc.) and secondly, when tax treaties concluded between Member 
States can provide a compensatory treatment by the home state over potentially 
discriminatory withholding tax charged by the source state. In other words, the general 
purpose of neutralisation is to provide a form of remedy or compensation that aims to 
remove the disadvantage caused by the discriminatory treatment either by means of 
national clauses or by the use of tax treaties.  
 
At first it might seems that since both methods target the same situation or are planned 
to achieve the same result, therefore the approach of the CJEU towards those two 
practices should be similar. The practice however shows that it is not the case as the 
reasoning differs to a significant extent and has been continuously adjusted in recent 
case law. While the domestic situation seeks for a relief from discrimination under the 
neutralisation offered by a parallel tax regime, the treaty-based neutralisation is 
concerned with the question whether or not treaty relief in the residence state under a 
tax treaty might relieve the source state from discrimination.17 
 
It has to be emphasised that neutralisation is an intangible and abstract concept; it does 
not have a fixed or universal formula that could be written down in a form a legal 
provision. It only carries out the idea that some discriminatory situations can be 
compensated for. Therefore under different circumstances outcome as to its application 
will vary. The CJEU approves the potential to its existence and effects it might secure, 
but in a very practical meaning it often has been left to the national courts to decide 
whether requirements are fulfilled.  
 
Some academics see it as a new form of justification.18 Perhaps one of the reasons for it 
comes from the fact that neutralisation is the discussed cases is usually explained at the 
end of the ruling, mostly in conjunction with the coherence of the taxation system and 
the language is most of the times not very clear. However, as stated earlier, the author of 
this work does not agree with such position - neutralisation often is discussed as a 
separate problem of possible compensation. Additionally, the field of its applicability is 
too narrow and limited in order to stand as a general defence to discrimination. 
 
The importance of this question is especially relevant for the proper understanding how 
the CJEU attempts to strike a balance between tax sovereignty of Member States and 
the EU fundamental freedoms rights,19 when the justification test is being assessed, and 
with the capability of safeguarding harmony suitable for the further development of the 
internal market. 
 
As mentioned earlier, the concept of neutralisation can be applicable in two types of 
situation: within the domestic setting or a cross-border situation involving tax treaties. 
As for the latter, some academics see the rationale for allowing neutralisation as it 
                                                
17 Georg Kofler, “Tax Treaty Neutralization of Source State Discrimination under the EU Fundamental 
Freedoms”, Bulletin for International Taxation (2011, vol.65, no.12) p 685. 
18 Vanessa Englmair, “The Relevance of the Fundamental Freedoms for Direct Taxation” in Michael 
Lang, Introduction to European Tax Law: Direct Taxation, supra note 12, pp. 78-78. 
19 Ben J.M.Terra and Peter J. Wattel, European Tax Law, (Kluwer Law International 2008, 5th ed) p 733.  
6 
 
would not be reasonable to interfere (in the light of the Treaty provisions) in the 
division of tax revenues agreed between the source and the home state under double tax 
convention. If Member States voluntarily take upon themselves an obligation to allow 
certain methods of reliving double taxation the Court should not set aside legally valid 
agreements that, if read together, do not violate fundamental freedoms.  
 
 
2.2. Neutralisation and non-discrimination 
 
Non-discrimination principle within the context of European is most probably one of 
the most well-described and analysed topic. The Treaty explicitly prohibits 
discrimination under Art. 18 TFEU and by means of fundamental freedoms. The 
requirement of comparable situations for the purpose of taxation often touches upon the 
distinction between residents and non-residents (enough to say that the topic of 
comparability most probably occurs in literature as often as the topic on non-
discrimination itself). Although in many areas the differentiation on the basis of 
residence would automatically trigger the situation of being contrary to Article 18 as 
being equal to discrimination based on nationally. However the situation in direct 
taxation puts the problem in a distinct perspective: the residence status is a factor that 
defines taxing competence of Member States.20 As earlier explained - direct taxation 
remains the exclusive competence of EU Member countries and consequently the 
different treatment based on the residence status becomes a norm rather than an 
uncommon or rare exception. Additionally, discrimination, which is understood as the 
difference in treatment, needs to result in less favourable service. Such situation can be 
addressed either if a different treatment is applied to similar circumstances or when 
similar treatment is applied to different circumstances.21  
 
Keeping that in mind, it will be logical to ask how relevant is the residence status to 
determine the ‘different circumstances’ used in the comparative analysis step. The 
general rule allows treating residents and non-residents differently as their situations can 
be fundamentally distinguished. However through the case law, the CJEU paved the 
possibility for taxpayers to claim the same treatment and certain tax allowances and 
benefits if their factual situation is the same,22 therefore not only purely legal stand is 
taken into consideration. For the purpose of analysing the application of neutralisation it 
is relevant as similar mechanism is used by the CJEU: although the legal situation is 
relevant, the actual circumstances and the final outcome are taken into account when 
assessing the effect of compensatory measures. 
 
When conducting the analysis whether the discrimination takes place, the CJEU focuses 
on so called the disadvantage test, and what receives the most attention is the relevance 
of offsetting the advantages.23 In theory, whenever a person (either natural or legal) 
suffers a disadvantage it should be possible to counterbalance the discrimination once 
another type of advantage is granted. Such reasoning naturally falls within the 
                                                
20 Richard Lyal, “Non-discrimination and direct tax in Community Law”, EC Tax Review (2003 vol.12 
no.2) p 68.  
21 A consequence of application of Art. 18 TFEU, developed in more detail through case law, for instance 
judgement in Schumacker, supra note 3. 
22 Judgement in Schumacker, supra note 3. 
23 Bammens, supra note 2, p 894. 
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discussion about efficiency of compensatory measures.24 However how this particular 
issue is addressed is not very systematic, as the case law suggests. We still lack a 
systematised definition of neutralisation and in general the Court is rather hesitant in 
approving the offset the less advantageous treatment with advantages granted either in 
the country where the discriminatory treatment occurs or elsewhere. Neutralisation 
therefore is not widely accepted by the Court, nevertheless in certain scenarios it is 
allowed more often than in others.  
 
One should ask what is the aimed position that claimant should be put after granting 
him a compensatory treatment; or in other words how neutralisation can cure the 
discriminatory treatment. More importantly, what is the benchmark for assessing 
whether a taxpayer has been compensated enough? Two notions become meaningful 
when considering the problem of restrictions of fundamental freedoms: the one of non-
discrimination and of equal treatment.25 Even though at first the two could be a 
substitute to one another, for the purpose of neutralisation the difference is crucial. It is 
the former approach that is prioritised and protected by the Court: not only the 
comparable situation has to be found, but it also has to lead to a disadvantageous 
treatment. If the priority was given towards the equal treatment it would be sufficient 
enough to only provide a difference in treatment, but the bar for discriminatory actions 
is placed higher than that. Therefore in terms of securing the neutralisation of difference 
in treatment the burden would also be different. 
  
Already in Avoir Fiscal26 case the Court was willing to conclude that regardless of the 
extent of the less favourable treatment or whether such disadvantage can be avoided by 
the use of other legal means the discrimination is still present.27 At the current stage the 
perspective whether additional advantages can offset the discrimination (so whether 
neutralisation can be allowed) is not harmonised and depends often which tax system 
intends to balance out the less favourable treatment (whether it is the state in which the 
scrutiny occurs or another Member State under the provisions of a tax treaty). As for the 
neutralisation within the domestic context the CJEU seems to be constantly confirming 
that additional tax rules available to non-residents do not remove discrimination, all 
they do is simply a coexistence parallel to the discriminatory provisions as chapter 3 of 
this work shows. Although several arguments have been presented why possible 
compensation or procedural remedy could be possible in all instances it has been 
rejected to allow such neutralisation. Tax treaty application on the other hand appears to 
receive a systematic relaxation in this strict approach and allows the transfer of 
obligation between Member States.   
 
 
2.3. Interaction between sources of law 
 
The analysis as to how neutralisation can be applied requires an overview of the 
relationship of legal orders and different sources of law: how they interact, what 
                                                
24 Adequacy of compensatory measures has in itself a wide range of literature and is subject to many aca-
demic discussion especially within the field of contract law and what type of damages might provide a 
sufficient level of compensation.  
25 Bammens, supra note 2, p 895.  
26 Judgement in Commission v France, case 270/83, ECLI:EU:C:1986:37. 
27 Ibidem, paras 21-22. 
8 
 
dependence relation they have and what compliance requirements need to be fulfilled. 
As the supremacy of EU law obliges Member States to recognise that the European 
legal order always takes precedence over domestic legislation in a situation of conflict.28 
However in certain areas Member States are the bodies having the competence to 
legislate with direct taxation being one of them. Each country therefore, except having 
individual domestic tax regime, is also capable of concluding tax treaties in order to 
provide a relief from double taxation. However despite the limited control mechanism 
on the European level over direct taxation, nevertheless those sources of law have to 
comply with fundamental principles of the EU.29 Interestingly, even though tax treaties 
are international agreements and constitute a part of a domestic legal order it was only 
recently decided that they in fact should also comply with EU standards, but on the 
other hand they also became capable of neutralising restriction on fundamental 
freedoms.30 One of the fundamental reasons why Member States conclude tax treaties 
(both within the EU scope and on the international stage) is to regulate taxing powers 
and to provide a relief from double taxation. However the Art. 293 from the former EC 
Treaty is no longer a part of the TEU or TFEU, therefore there is no clear recognition 
for the obligation for the avoidance of double taxation as a objective on the Union. The 
above-mentioned provision used to serve as a legal basis for taxpayers who were 
claiming the breach of EU law in situations when they faced double taxation. Although 
the double taxation in itself cannot be claimed as a breach of EU law, if it falls under 
discriminatory treatment it can still be a subject to CJEU investigation.31  
As Member States are free to apportion tax jurisdiction between themselves (while the 
principle of territoriality also allows in theory an establishment of any preferable 
taxation methods) it is their choice as to how a relief from double taxation should be 
granted. Tax treaties function under public international law and become equally 
relevant for two domestic legal orders of contracting states and links the two systems.32  
 
If the same tax treaty binds two contracting Member States, then those state become 
linked with the effect that is binding and might have impact on the analysis of the 
restriction in the source state. In turn, this can have a deciding effect whether 
neutralisation can be valid in a particular case. The transfer of obligations and 
application of compensation can only receive recognition in the EU light only when the 
home state (state of residence) accepts its obligations to grant a tax credit for the tax 
previously paid by means of withholding tax on dividends.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
28 Judgement in Costa v ENEL, case 6/64, ECLI:EU:C:1964:66.  
29 Judgement in Test Claimants in Act GLO IV, C-374/04, ECLI:EU:C:2006:773, para 36. 
30 Tom O’Shea, “Double Tax Conventions and Compliance with EU Law”, The EC Tax Journal, (2010, 
vol.11)  p 99. 
31 European Commission Initiative, Tackling discrimination and double taxation of dividends paid across 
borders, available online: http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/impact/planned_ia/docs/2012_taxud_001_cross_border_dividends_en.pdf   accessed 10th May 
2014. 
32 Kofler, supra note 17, p 686.  
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3. Neutralisation in domestic situation 
 
3.1. General overview 
 
As mentioned earlier, Member States are free to decide upon their direct taxation rules 
within their territory. Nevertheless, as practice shows, the jurisdiction to tax in order to 
exist has to establish an effective link between the country willing to tax and the 
taxpayer or his income. Therefore due to the type of those connecting factors we can 
distinguish the residence and source based taxation.33 The former occurs when a person 
is taxed based on the income received within the country’s territory, regardless of the 
status of resident and/or non-resident. The latter on the other hand taxes only residents, 
regardless of the source of income. In it not usual that both situations often clash with 
one another, which in turn might lead to juridical double taxation.  
 
Domestic application of neutralisation differs from conditions set out by the tax treaty 
application (which will be discussed in detail later). Such concept is not based on 
granting additional advantages, but it compensates in the form of a procedural remedy34 
when a Member States recognises difference in treatment between categories of 
taxpayers and attempts to create optional provisions within the domestic tax legislation 
that would counterbalance any disadvantages suffered by means of another legal 
procedure. The advantages received would be of the same nature as those available to 
the other category of taxpayers. 
 
Although some would see the procedural domestic remedy requirements as easier to 
fulfil than those established in cases involving tax treaties, nevertheless it should be 
noticed that in none of the cases presented in this work the remedy offered by Member 
States was held to be not satisfactory and in consequence the discrimination was found. 
Moreover the CJEU and Advocates General consistently reaffirm that ‘opt-in’ clauses 
do not remove discrimination. Therefore despite rejecting reasoning presented by 
Member States it does not interchangeably state it would accept such neutralisation if 
amended in a certain way. In fact, the Gielen35 case suggests that the idea of the 
optional tax regime for non-residents should not be allowed as a matter of principle, but 
on the other hand the facts of the case were quite specific and therefore it cannot be 
taken for granted that the stand taken by the Court will not be alternated or modified in 
the future (which should not surprise based on the evolution of the approach towards the 
tax treaties as explained later). The core problem in understanding cases concerning 
neutralisation applicable in the domestic situations is to understand that the fact that a 
taxpayer might be subject to two different types of regimes (and which one he chooses 
is optional) does not automatically have to result in discrimination when Treaty 
freedoms are exercises. It is different however when a Member State claims, such as in 
the discussed case, that making one of the discriminatory regimes only optional does 
not make it any less discriminatory.36 Yet it provides one more argument as to why 
neutralisation should be seen as a compensatory measure and not a ground for 
justification.   
 
                                                
33 Christiana H.J.I Panayi, European Union Corporate Tax (Cambridge University Press 2013) p 157. 
34 Bammens, supra note 2, p 941. 
35 Judgement in Gielen, C-440/08, ECLI:EU:C:2010:148.  
36 Bammens, supra note 2, pp. 986-987.  
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3.2. Gielen37 
 
The case of Mr Gielen provides one of the most clear examples when a Member State 
pursuit to neutralise domestic discriminatory treatment. In the discussed scenario the 
dispute arose under the difference in treatment between residents and non-residents in 
relation to calculation of hours worked abroad for the purpose of tax deductions. 
According to the facts, in the Netherlands it was possible to receive a deduction from 
taxable income by those who were self-employed, however the requirement was to 
work 1225 hours or more in their business in the country. Residents were allowed to 
combine the hours test when working in their business both in the Netherlands and 
another Member States. Such rules were not applicable to non-residents unless they 
satisfied the hours test only on the Dutch territory or opt in to be taxed as a resident. The 
non-resident option did not allow to include hours worked in another Member State.  
 
The Dutch government put the argument that relevant domestic mechanism in fact 
allowed non-residents to be treated as residents for tax purposes and for that reasons any 
discrimination should be neutralised. The assumption was therefore that neutralisation 
occurs when there is an option (therefore a voluntary choice for a taxpayer) to be taxed 
as resident.  
 
Such line of reasoning was rejected by both AG and the CJEU, by stating that such 
system creates a division in a national tax system into a discriminatory regime and 
regime which is deemed not to be discriminatory.38 Although the conclusion reached by 
the Court and Advocate General was the same, the CJEU followed the approach that 
alternative as to the choice of methods of taxation cannot remove discrimination or 
neutralise its effects. However such stand was concluded rather briefly in paragraph 52 
of the judgement by referring to the evaluation provided by the Advocate General. It is 
therefore important to adduce the analysis in more depth. 
 
Part of the judgement focused on evaluation that merely providing an option for a 
different method of taxation cannot in principle neutralise discriminatory treatment. The 
issue has been presented as “a problem relating to the principle of equal treatment and 
whether unlawful discrimination could become lawful if it is freely chosen by the 
victim”.39 Advocate General pointed out that indeed, it is a common situation in direct 
taxation when taxpayers are given a choice or an option of alternative arrangements, 
which not necessarily are advantageous. Further, he disagreed that the right of option 
has the effect of neutralising the discrimination,40 as the effect of such reasoning would 
lead to a situation when a person (natural or legal) would have a choice between a 
lawful and an unlawful option,41 but agreeing on a specific type of treatment would 
mean that that person would loose the right to complain, and as in the case at issue, Mr 
Gielen after choosing to be taxed as resident could not argue that the set of rules 
                                                
37 Judgement in Gielen, supra note 35. 
38 See judgement in Gielen, supra note 35. Such conclusion could be drawn from the Courts conclusion in 
para 52: “if such a choice were to be recognised as having the effect described, the consequence would be 
to validate a tax regime which, in itself, remains contrary to Article 49 TFEU by reason of its discrimina-
tory nature”. 
39 Advocate General opinion in Gielen, C-440/08, ECLI:EU:C:2009:661, para 46.   
40 Ibidem, para 49.  
41 Ibidem, para 50.  
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applicable to non-residents is discriminatory. The optionality of the method of taxation 
(out of which one is discriminatory) does not amount to equal treatment simply because 
the option is available.42 On the other hand however, one may wonder what is the 
position if the option for specifically opted for by a taxpayer and was not only a 
hypothetical alternative. In the author’s opinion, it does not seem that the position of the 
CJEU would change as the discriminatory order still remain. Additionally, due to the 
necessity of administrative compliance with two different tax authorities that non-
residence experience when if are deemed to be taxed as residents. Therefore even based 
on the administrative situation, there is no equal treatment and parallel domestic 
provisions cannot secure the neutralisation of discrimination. Allowing neutralisation in 
any of the above situations would simply validate the system that is discriminatory in 
nature.43 
 
The opinion presented by the Advocate General and followed by the CJEU made it 
clear that the optimality of an alternative tax regime does not remove the discriminatory 
treatment nor makes it any less discriminatory. Yet it still remains an open issue, 
whether the same conclusions would be reached if the treatment of non-residents would 
be operated as an automatic procedural treatment. Such mechanism would be applicable 
on a similar basis and comparable to the automatic accessibility of double tax 
conventions. However the downside of this method could turn to be the lack of option. 
As if such system was automatic, taxpayers would have been left with only one method 
of taxation, therefore their position could remain disadvantageous because of it, 
especially in the context of non-residents. Offsetting disadvantages provided by 
domestic legislation and those secured by tax treaties44 even if in theory aims at the 
same result receives very different approach from CJEU. 
 
 
3.3.  Beker & Beker45 
 
The case interpreted the compatibility of German rules in relation to the computation of 
the maximum tax credit granted to its residents who receive their income from another 
Member State. Specifically, it was important to decide whether the home state needs to 
take into account the “personal circumstances” (e.g. personal and/or family 
circumstances) for the purpose of determining the tax paid in the source state, which 
should be credited against the tax due to in the resident state.  
 
Mr and Mrs Beker were subject to unlimited tax liability in Germany and the main part 
of their income originated from Germany. However, certain investments were located in 
another Member State as well as in third States. When dividends from such investment 
were distributed the withholding tax at the source State applied, but the couple argued 
that German tax credit rules were in conflict with Art. 63 TFEU as the calculation of the 
credit is more beneficial to residents who receive foreign income only in proportion to 
the domestic income and the proportion of allowances is not taken into account by the 
tax authorities in Germany when calculating the income tax.  
 
                                                
42 Ibidem, para 52.  
43 See judgement in Gielen, supra note 35, para 52. 
44 Bammens, supra note 2, p 946. 
45 Judgement in Beker & Beker, C-168/11, ECLI:EU:C:2013:117. 
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Although the ratio decidendi of the case focused similarly to the De Groot46 case 
considered precisely the obligations of the home state towards its residents when 
granting tax allowances based on the personal and family circumstances, nevertheless 
the obiter dictum presented by both Advocate General Mengozzi and the CJEU 
considered the possibility of the need of preserving the coherence of a tax system that 
could provide grounds for a valid restriction of fundamental freedoms if a compensatory 
effect could be demonstrated.47 This however has been rejected because, although in 
theory such situation might be possible, it requires a precise compensatory effect that 
needs to be demonstrated between a tax advantage and a specific tax payable for the 
purpose of preserving an essential element of the tax system.  
 
Additionally, having an option of an alternative scheme (other than tax calculation) and 
when the taxpayer exercises such option, the set-off mechanism is not applied and the 
tax paid abroad is deducted from the overall tax base. As Advocate General explained in 
para 58 as the practical exercise of the option only brings about a ‘classic’ situation of 
double taxation in which the State of residence considers that all income acquired by the 
taxpayer both at home and abroad is taxable. In that scenario when the option provides 
the choice when the double taxation is not reduced, but at the current situation Member 
States are not obliged to remove or eliminate double taxation under the obligations of 
the EU law.48 Therefore simply having a tax measure that does not eliminate double 
taxation does not automatically qualify such law as being incompatible with the treaty 
provisions. But the question “whether the possibility given to the taxpayer to opt for a 
legal regime which is generally less advantageous, but not incompatible with Union 
law, renders the tax system under consideration compatible as a whole” still remains 
valid.49 
 
The answer given by the CJEU followed the Advocate’s General opinion that the right 
of option does not make it possible to render such situation as being compatible with 
EU law. A tax regime cannot compensate for the unlawfulness of a scheme by an 
additional option, especially when the unlawful scheme is the one being applied 
automatically. Moreover, simply having a right of option does not, in itself, correct the 
illegal nature of the system.50 The mechanism used by the German government (the 
option to choose the deduction of the foreign tax from the tax base as an expense rather 
than a tax credit) could not rectify the infringement of the Union law. As mentioned 
earlier, the problem was not evaluated in detail and it appears that the main argument 
behind the negative conclusion about the right of option was because the discriminatory 
regime was applicable automatically. One can ask therefore whether the decision could 
have been different if none of the taxation methods was automatic or if the parallel 
option was exercised as the primary one. Neither Advocate General, nor the CJEU 
opened the door for such discussion, as the general question whether the option for a 
taxpayer for choosing less favourable treatment, but which was compatible with EU law 
was answered in negative. Therefore even though Member States do not have a formal 
obligation under the Treaty to remove double taxation, the purely domestic provision 
cannot compensate or neutralise the discriminatory regime.  
                                                
46 Judgement in De Groot, C-385/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:750. 
47 Advocate General opinion in Beker & Beker, C-168/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:452, para 56.  
48 Especially after the removal of Art. 293 from the Treaty. 
49 Advocate General opinion in Beker & Beker, supra note 47, para 60.  
50 Judgement in Beker & Beker, supra note 45, para 62. 
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3.4. Hirvonen51  
 
The case of Ms Hilkka Hirvonen yet again rises the question what is the relation 
between co-existing tax regimes which offer different treatment to residents and non-
residents and whether the right of option could neutralise the potentially discriminative 
legislation. The claimant worked in Sweden and her professional income originated 
there. After moving to Finland she started receiving her pension from Sweden for which 
she was still taxed at the source State as non-resident (at the fixed rate of 25%, now 
20%). However after the CJEU case law development Swedish government made 
adjustments in the tax system and allowing non-residents to be taxed as residents, which 
in turn would allow them to enjoy certain benefits and deductions: in this particular case 
it was the deduction on the mortgage interest for the house in Finland. Mr Hirvonen 
consequently applied for the resident taxation in 2006, however claimed that between 
2000-2005 she should also receive the deduction of the mortgage interest.  
 
The problem arises from the fact that Swedish tax law offers two methods of taxation, 
in particular either the unlimited tax liability at a progressive tax rate with the 
possibility of all deductions or the limited tax liability with the standard tax rate when 
personal deductions are limited to when the taxable income originates solely from 
Sweden.52 The claimant argues that despite the possibility of option, the taxation as 
non-resident (for the specified period of time) does not provide a solution for the 
deduction of a interest on mortgage.  
 
The CJEU will have to determine whether income related deductions should be granted 
to non-residents who could obtain such right if they decide to opt in for a resident 
taxation, but who nevertheless prefer to be taxed as non-residents. If the Court follows 
its previous findings from the Gielen case to be applicable, then the right of option that 
had a potential of removing the disadvantage will be rejected as a possibility of 
removing discrimination. Nevertheless, one has to remember that Gielen was decided 
based on the specific facts, and the Swedish case already offers some deductions. 
Nevertheless it can be expected that the argument provided by the Swedish tax 
authorities that there is no discrimination if the right of option is exercised was the same 
one provided in Gielen and it was clearly held by the CJEU that discrimination is not 
removed in such circumstances - the situation in only changed in a manner that another 
system is added, the non-discriminatory one, but the other remaining one does not 
become any less discriminatory because of that.  
 
Member States are left with the option that they can treat different categories of 
taxpayers differently (by means of procedural differentiations) but those cannot result is 
discriminatory or less advantageous treatment between similar categories or taxpayers 
in the comparable situations. Although neutralisation intends to provide a compensatory 
optional treatment but insofar as the case law shows, such procedural remedy has not 
yet been approved by the Court. Therefore from the purely legal perspective the non-
discriminatory parallel system does not guarantee neutralisation. However the factual 
situation of Ms Hirvonen has been calculated during the domestic proceedings, showing 
                                                
51 Case C-632/13, not reported yet, neither AG opinion, nor the judgement has been released at the time 
of writing. 
52 Cecile Brokelind, “Hirvonen case and commentary”, Highlights and Insights in European Taxation 
(2014, no. 4) pp. 28-31.  
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that in fact even without the allowance for the interest deduction her tax situation was 
better off as a non-resident.53 Yet again, it is rather unlikely that the CJEU would get 
involved into the matter of technical calculation - the case law makes it clear, that it is 
up to the national court to decide upon the factual situation of a taxpayer. 
 
 
3.5. Conclusions for neutralisation by means of parallel taxation system 
 
As the selection of the case law shows, the Court has been hesitant to approve the use of 
the right of option to neutralise less favourable treatment. Naturally, some questions 
related to the topic still remain unanswered and future cases might create variations as 
to the established principle. The Hirvonen case demonstrates that despite present rules 
there is still lack of clarity as to how to treat the tax regimes that exists alongside but 
relate to residents and non-residents. Although it has been long established that the 
position of residents and non-residents is not comparable from the legal point of view, 
the CJEU in certain cases blurs the distinction whether the legal or factual situation 
should be taken into account when assessing the potentially discriminatory treatment.  
 
The problem of neutralisation as a counterbalance within the domestic context does not 
occur as often as neutralisation involving tax treaties. Despite several indicators as how 
hypothetically it could be allowed, meaning the fulfilment of securing legal certainty, 
adequate form of compensation or procedural remedy, the automatic access to the 
parallel system (although there has not been 100% clarity in that regard, the CJEU only 
indicated that the non-discriminatory treatment is not automatically given therefore it 
upholds the more restrictive regime). Nevertheless, after the judgement in Gielen case it 
will be difficult to open the door and to affirm neutralisation, as it appears that the right 
of option so far has been rejected in general as a principle. However, as the Swedish tax 
authorities argue in the Hirvonen case, that Member States represents two different 
taxation systems (progressive for residents and proportional for non-residents) while 
other cases simply assess the application of different rules within the scope of the same 
tax regime. That argument however might not be too convincing as simply any rules 
applicable to non-residents could be claimed as a separate tax system, when in reality 
they only supplement the entirety of a national tax system.  
 
4. Neutralisation and tax treaties 
 
4.1. General overview 
 
As evaluated earlier, situations when tax jurisdictions clash with one another are quite 
common and may include interaction between two residence taxation, two source 
taxation. On the EU ground it it most frequent example however when a residence and 
source taxation lead to problematic situations. For instance upon payment of dividends 
they might be subject to withholding tax at the source state and income tax at the 
resident state. Such juridical double taxation is one of the reasons why Member States 
decide to conclude double tax conventions - to avoid or to reduce the burden of 
situations that will be disadvantageous for taxpayers. The EC Treaty used to contain a 
                                                
53 As the non-resident fixed tax rate (25% now 20%) was more advantageous than the progressive tax rate 
(30%, 50% up to 55%). 
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provision that Member States should avoid such situations.54 The case law confirms55 
that Member States retain the power to decide on the content of tax treaties or whether 
to enter into such agreements, as there are no harmonised measures on the EU level that 
would require specific composition or criteria of the tax treaties. Both contracting 
parties need to divide the right of their fiscal competence and the allocation of taxing 
powers. Such task is not an easy one, and as the growing number of case law confirms 
that despite Member States’ freedom to choose the method applicable in tax treaties and 
to exercise the powers of taxation vested in them, they nevertheless have to comply with 
EU law.   
 
There is an ongoing debate as to whether Member States should be obliged to extend or 
adapt their own tax systems to the system of another Member State (closely linked to 
the Most Favourable Nation principle) in order to eliminate double taxation. It is 
however beyond the scope of this work to discuss it in detail; for the purpose of this 
assessment it is worth noting that the exercise of two equal and parallel taxing powers 
might lead to the difference in treatment. The question is whether legislation that leads 
to the restriction of fundamental freedoms or which in any other means violates the non-
discriminatory principle could be potentially cured and compensated for under tax 
treaties. However to in order to be able to start such analysis one has to agree that tax 
treaties could be examined from the perspective of compliance with EU law.  
 
The review of the case law at the current stage points out that tax treaties, as being part 
of domestic legislation and national tax rules, also need to be evaluated when deciding 
whether treaty provisions have been violated.56 As introduced earlier, the concept of 
neutralisation serves the purpose of compensating for the difference in treatment. The 
difficulty arises however with the lack of standard to what extend the compensation 
should be provided. The rulings of the CJEU only establish certain criterions of a 
general nature, for instance that tax treaties do not always compensate the 
discriminatory treatment in full,57 that the tax treatment in residence Member State is 
not taken into evaluation (single country oriented approach), as each Member State 
should ensure the non-discriminatory treatment,58 or that not only the legal intention 
behind the tax treaties are relevant as the actual / factual results are to be duly taken into 
account.59  
 
The difference between the “overall approach” and “single state” approach is a 
significant one as it determines what should be taken into account when determining if 
fundamental freedoms were violated and whether the situation in the other contracting 
state could compensate for such discrimination.60 There has not been much consistency 
within judgements as to which of the two should prevail, nevertheless it has been 
suggested in academic writings commenting the recent case law that the overall 
approach represents majority of cases. Although the early case law seemed to be more 
                                                
54 Article 293 of the former EC Treaty.  
55 See for example cases: judgements in Gilly, C-336/96, ECLI:EU:C:1998:221and Gschwind, C-391/97, 
ECLI:EU:C:1999:409. 
56 Judgement in Bouanich, supra note 7. 
57 Judgement in Commission v Italy, supra note 13, para 37. 
58 Kofler., supra note 17, p 684. 
59 The CJEU introduced the principle in Schumacker, super note 3,that not only legal, but also factual 
situation has to be taken into account. 
60 Panayi, supra note 33, p 165. 
16 
 
strict by stating that benefits from other Member States are “irrelevant and cannot 
justify less favourable in tax matters”.61 Nevertheless in subsequent cases Advocate 
General Geelhoed called for the application of the “overall approach”  suggesting that 
tax obligations and benefits in both source and residence states aim at “achieving an 
equilibrium”62 and that analysis from only one perspective might lead to incomplete 
reality; such approach was adapted in ACT GLO IV63, Denkavit64 or Thin Cap GLO.65 
 
Additionally, it was the Bouanich66 case that clearly confirmed that tax treaties should 
be added up to the equation when balancing the domestic tax responsibilities and EU 
obligations. The CJEU ruling clarified that tax treaties should be taken into 
consideration when determining whether discrimination occurred, however the specific 
decision is for the national court to determine such situation.  It is important to notice 
then, that the content of the tax treaty is relevant not only from purely legal perspective, 
but what factual outcome it secures.67  
 
The current understanding of the concept of neutralisation and a method of its 
application went through a multistage development: whether tax treaties form part of 
domestic law, whether the potential benefits in another contracting state can be taken 
into account when assessing the potential compensation of the discrimination, the 
effectiveness of tax treaty provision to provide the neutralising effect on discriminatory 
legislation. Within the interpretation of tax treaties the strict approach of not allowing 
any compensatory or neutralising measures has been relaxed, as opposed to the 
neutralisation occurring on purely domestic ground.  
 
What distinguishes the non-discrimination principle from other situations in law where 
compensation could be applied is that the disadvantage can be only hypothetical, and no 
actual damage needs to occur to be capable of classifying a legal principle 
discriminatory.68 Including the effects of the tax treaties in the discriminatory 
application of fundamental freedoms allows the use of the agreement as a tie-breaker as 
it accepts the taxing powers between Member States, without the disadvantage for the 
taxpayer. If a home (resident) state accepted the obligation under the tax treaty in a 
legally binding and internationally recognised agreement there should be no objections 
as to why such convention should not be allowed as a part of domestic law. However 
the position adopted by the CJEU was not always so straightforward.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                
61 See for example judgement in Eurowings, C-294/97, ECLI:EU:C:1999:524, para 44 or judgement in 
Danner, C-136/00, ECLI:EU:C:2002:558, para 56.    
62 Advocate General opinion in Denkavit, C-170/05, ECLI:EU:C:2006:266, para 37.  
63 Jugement in Test Claimants in Act GLO IV, supra note 29. 
64 Judgement in Denkavit, C-170/05, ECLI:EU:C:2006:783.  
65 Judgement in Thin Cap Glo, C-524/04, ECLI:EU:C:2007:161.  
66 Judgement in Bouanich, supra note 7.  
67 Judgement in Act GLO IV, supra note 29, para 60.  
68 See for instance judgement in Thin Cap GLO, supra note 65, para 62. 
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4.2. Avoir fiscal69 
 
The Court initiated the consideration over the general compatibility of tax treaties with 
the Community law already in 1960s, however it was not until 1980s that the CJEU 
started the more complex analysis of the relationship between tax treaties and EU law.70  
 
The case concerned tax credit rules “avoir fiscal” which allowed an application towards 
French resident companies, but refused the similar treatment to non-resident bodies that 
only had branches in France. As the starting point for the neutralisation analysis would 
be the comparability criteria and the Court decided that when profits of residents 
companies and non-resident beaches are taxed in the same manner, then they are in 
comparable situation. One of the arguments put forward by the French government to 
justify the discriminatory treatment was inter alia that companies from other Member 
States could easily become incorporated (and therefore automatically qualify for the tax 
credit) or that the problem should be solved on either the EU level (as national laws in 
the specific area differed a lot) or by DTC because non-residents avoid certain tax 
burdens and can enjoy other tax benefits, therefore they did not suffer any significant 
disadvantage.  
 
The case of Avoir Fiscal is undoubtedly one of the most important cases for the field of 
direct taxation in general. In respect of neutralisation it established the early approach 
towards the concept of compensation for discrimination by offsetting it with other 
advantages. The Court was hesitant to accept such argumentation provided by the 
French government and clarified for the first time that  “the rights conferred by article 
[52] of the Treaty are unconditional and a Member State cannot make respect for them 
subject to the contents of an agreement concluded with another Member State”,71 
additionally to emphasise even more the subordinate character of bilateral tax treaties, 
the court later added in the same judgement that Treaty provisions do not permit 
fundamental freedoms rights to be made subject to a condition of reciprocity imposed 
for the purpose of obtaining corresponding advantages in other Member States. 
 
The substance of the case provided that any assessment of discrimination not only has 
to be concluded in isolation, but it cannot be analysed from the perspective of potential 
neutralisation provided by other measure, as in the case, the tax treaty. The importance 
of the analysis in isolation was subsequently used in reasoning for the second argument 
provided by the French Government, that disadvantage suffered was a corresponding 
treatment to what French companies may experience in other Member State. Therefore 
the reciprocity principle was intended to used for both: advantages and disadvantages, 
but such proposal was rejected by the AG and later by the Court.  
 
 
 
 
                                                
69 Judgement in Commission v France, supra note 26. 
70 EC Law and Tax Treaties, Workshop of Experts, available online at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/personal_tax/double_tax_conventions
/eclawtaxtreaties_en.pdf  (website accessed on 1st April 2014).  
71 Judgement in Commission v France, supra note 26, para 26. 
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4.3. Bouanich72 
 
The dispute investigated the tax treaty application in French-Swedish situation. 
Margaretha Bouanich was a French resident and hold certain shares in Swedish 
company which decided to repurchase the shares. The problem arose upon different 
treatment of residents and non-residents under Swedish tax law upon the possibility of 
the deduction of the acquisition costs for residents (when the capital gain is taxed at the 
rate of 30%). Non-residents could not exercise the option of deduction and 15% 
withholding tax rate was applicable at the source State while any capital gain that 
resulted from the sale was to be taxed at the resident State.  
 
The case at issue constituted a landmark impact on the understanding of the 
neutralisation and its applicability in situations where tax treaties are involved and the 
compensatory measure is to be secured by the other contracting State. The CJEU 
decided to examine whether the Swedish-French tax treaty is capable of removing the 
restriction on the free movement of capital and therefore neutralise the discriminatory 
provision. The Court engaged two-step analysis in order to determine whether the 
breach of fundamental freedoms could be neutralised under the correct application of 
the tax treaty, despite the argument from the Commission’s side referring back to the 
approach established in Avoir Fiscal or Saint-Gobain73. 
 
Firstly, it was examined whether the convention was of any relevance for the 
compatibility of national provisions in the State introducing treatment infringing 
fundamental freedoms and to what extend the discrimination occurs under the treaty. 
Secondly, when the answer to question one is affirmative the Court needs to analyse the 
mitigating effect74 so the next step could focus whether in practical terms the restriction 
was removed. As the CJEU stated “tax treaties has to be taken into account in 
determining whether tax legislation is consistent with Community rules on the free 
movement of capital. If that is the case, it falls then to be established whether that 
agreement removes the restriction on fundamental freedom that has been found to 
exist”.75   
 
The judgement of the case made it clear that potential breaches relating to restrictions 
over fundamental freedoms can be healed by the income tax treaty provisions. However 
it has to be kept in mind that although the Court confirmed it is necessary to take tax 
treaties into consideration as a part of the domestic legal order, nevertheless it is for the 
national courts to determine whether the treatment in cross-border situations is treated 
as in the domestic situation and that has to be based on the factual analysis of the case 
facts.76 This allows to conclude that the CJEU in practice opened the possibility for the 
domestic judges to examine and evaluate whether national legislation combined with 
effects of tax treaties can neutralise restrictions of EU law. However as noticed before, 
those are the questions that call for the factual analysis that are not dealt by the CJEU 
which could also explain why neutralisation as such could not be treated as a general 
                                                
72 Judgement in Bouanich, supra note 7. 
73 Judgement in Saint Gobain, C-307/97, ECLI:EU:C:1999:438.  
74 Isenbaert Mathieu, EC Law and the Sovereignty of the Member States in Direct Taxation (IBFD 2010) 
 p 474. 
75 Judgement in Bouanich, supra note 7, para 48.  
76 Ibidem, para 51.  
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ground for justification as some academics would like to present. As Juliane Kokott 
pointed out, “double tax conventions cannot in itself justify discriminations, but 
advantages that may result from their application may compensate disadvantages 
constituted by such discriminations”.77 As such tax treaties have the capacity of 
influencing taxpayer’s decisions and effect his position in front of the tax authorities 
and for that reason it should be allowed to grand any positive action that might be the 
result of neutralisation. 
 
 
4.4. Denkavit78 
 
French legislation at the time of the case provided an exemption for French companies 
receiving dividends from their French subsidiaries (not subject to withholding tax) and 
additionally they were entitled to participation exemption. On the other hand, non 
French companies were subject to withholding tax at 25% rate. Denkavit concerned 
distribution made by French companies to their Dutch parent company. According to 
the French-Dutch tax treaty it was allowed to levy 5% withholding tax by France and in 
the Netherlands to make dividends as a part of the tax base. However, according to the 
Dutch legislation the foreign source dividends were exempt from tax then it resulted in 
no credit given for the tax paid in France. Therefore despite the usual method of 
granting a credit for withholding tax, the practical application of the tax treaty did not 
result in any relief, which is the main factor when considering neutralisation. 
 
The case provided further needed explanatory comments on the neutralisation and 
compensatory character of tax treaties. Especially Advocate’s General opinion, and 
although not legally binding, it nevertheless presented several valid observations in 
relation to the concept of neutralisation. For instance when justifying the overall 
approach of taking tax treaties into consideration, namely that ignoring the content of 
such agreements would effectively result in neglecting the economic reality of the 
taxable subject, and in practice could lead to a limited cross-border activity which 
clearly go against the foundations of the Internal Market.79 Additionally, the obligations 
undertaken by the home and source states towards fulfilment of the Internal Market 
should be seen from the broader perspective, or as AG Geelhoed called it “as achieving 
a type of equilibrium”.80 This perspective allows to place the concept of neutralisation 
within the broad context of not only the legal order and relationship between Member 
States but also general concepts behind the creation of the EU, such as the idea of 
internal market.  
 
As Georg Kofler pointed out, Denkavit and Amurta gave the foundation of what can be 
described as “treaty-based overall approach”81 within the application of neutralisation 
for withholding tax on dividends. The approach however requires the full neutralisation 
to be applicable, stating that partial neutralisation is not sufficient enough, which 
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upholds the source state’s obligation to grant the exemption from the supposedly 
discriminatory withholding tax.  
 
While in Denkavit the combined effect of the application of the tax treaty and domestic 
provisions still did not remove the disadvantage as the application of the tax credit was 
impossible in practice and the CJEU precluded the nation legislation for that reason, it 
left the door open that the opposite situation, namely when the combined effect of the 
tax treaty and the national law allows to apply the compensatory credit then the 
disadvantage could be removed. It is worth noticing, that even when the disadvantage is 
of a minor nature, it is still precluded as a restriction of the freedom of establishment.82   
 
 
4.5. Amurta83 
 
The difficulties with application of neutralisation arose once again in the case of 
Amurta, a Portuguese company (with a resident status) which hold shares in a Dutch 
resident company. Upon payment of dividends by the Dutch company to shareholders 
25% of withholding tax was levied. Within the domestic situation (Dutch-to-Dutch 
company) with a minimum 5% shareholding a waiver was applicable while the cross-
border situation did not receive such benefit.  
 
The case yet again brought into attention the problem of neutralisation of potentially 
discriminatory treatment. The difficulty of granting tax credit in specific situations 
needed more in-depth explanation after the Denkavit case, particularly whether the less 
advantageous treatment occurring in the Netherlands could be compensated by the full 
tax credit by the recipient shareholder’s state (state of residence). The judgement 
initially started with the reminder that the violation of fundamental freedoms could not 
be counterbalanced by any existing tax advantages. However, such position was 
emphasised to be true in relation to tax benefits or advantages that are granted 
unilaterally, but the position towards tax treaties was different.  
 
The case therefore clearly opened the door for the neutralisation under the tax treaty (as 
said in para 79): “it cannot be excluded that Member States may succeed in ensuring 
compliance with its obligation under the Treaty through the conclusion of a convention 
for the avoidance of double taxation with another Member State”. Similar approach 
echoed later in both cases in relation to outbound dividends in Commission v Italy and 
Commission v Spain ( see para 36 and para 39).  
 
The Court provided an explanatory remark on the interaction between double tax 
convention and domestic legislation and how the latter can ensure Member State’s 
compliance with EU obligations. In terms of explaining the neutralisation under the tax 
treaty it suggested that bilateral convention should ensure the “national treatment”84 in 
the host Member State. Additionally, it was relevant that not only legal situation was 
analysed (providing the credit method), however the detailed analysis disclosed that the 
ordinary credit applicable under the tax convention in the factual application did not 
apply, therefore the Dutch government could not claim that the restriction of 
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fundamental freedoms was neutralised. Therefore not only legal, but also factual 
situation in relevant for deciding in each case whether the phenomenon of neutralisation 
occurs and whether it can be used. It is possible to see that in many aspects the Court 
echoed the reasoning already given in Bouanich as both concerned the situation from 
the source State perspective: that tax treaties need to be considered as a part of domestic 
legislation, but that it is for the national court to determine “to what extend such 
conventions do secure national treatment in cross-border situations”.85 
 
 
4.6. Commission v Spain 
 
Commission v Spain86 is yet another case (after Commission v Italy) that brought more 
clarification into the issue of the role of tax treaties and their meaning for EU law. It 
also involved the outbound dividends - non resident companies were required to have 
20% shareholding in Spanish companies to be able to benefit from exempt taxation 
while the threshold for resident companies was only 5%. As the Parent-Subsidiary 
Directive87 allowed Member States to choose adequate methods to avoid economic 
double taxation, the Court nevertheless noticed that such measures cannot contravene 
provisions of the Treaty.88 The Spanish Government argued that the situation of resident 
companies in Spain and companies resident and established in another Member State 
which receive dividends from Spain is not objectively comparable. In consequence, the 
lack of comparability should shift the burden of relief of double taxation into the 
residence state, and not the source state (Spain).89 
 
Not surprisingly, the stand presented by the Spanish government was rejected by the 
CJEU, after declaring that although in theory the situation of residents and non-
residents are not comparable, the Member State (Spain) by means of introducing a 
taxing regime applicable to both groups made their situation comparable.  
 
Another argument brought by the Spanish Government was based on the parallel 
exercise of taxing powers and that any excessive tax obligations were the result of 
taxation imposed by the Member State of the recipient company. The Court also 
rejected this claim but explain that in fact tax treaties might be used to ensure the 
compliance with the Treaty, but in order to satisfy such treatment the convention “must 
allow the effects of the difference in treatment under national legislation to be 
compensated for”.90 However in the case at issue the Court did not find that more 
restrictive national measure was neutralised and the less favourable conditions were 
purely the result of the domestic tax regime.  
 
Interestingly, except the above mentioned argumentation, no formal ground for 
justification was claimed by the accused Member State. This suggests that  earlier 
judgements rendered by the CJEU in Denkavit, Amurta and Commission v Italy already 
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established a coherent approach, which would not allow any of the commonly claimed 
justifications in this type of cases. 
 
As for the mechanism of neutralisation it was explained that it could be considered as a 
valid tool if the terms of the tax treaty would allow setting off the tax withheld at the 
source state against the tax due in another Member State.91 In addition, such deduction 
needs to be “in its entirety”.92 Moreover, Member States cannot rely on more favourable 
treatment present in another Member States in order to relief the extensive tax burden to 
escape their own obligations, regardless whether it is an exemption for the dividends 
received or any other tax benefit.93 However the application of tax treaties does not 
always compensate the difference in treatment, thus the neutralisation is not always 
accepted and there is no positive obligation to apply it every time.94 The difference is 
visible, especially when considering application of ordinary tax credit and the full tax 
credit. The mechanism of ordinary tax credit allows the residence state to grant the 
credit for the tax already paid in the source state, however that being only limited to the 
proportion that would be payable in the residence state on the foreign source income. 
This does not remove disadvantageous treatment in every situation, for instance where 
the tax rate is proved to be higher at the source state and foreign tax already paid is not 
compensated entirely. Therefore the condition set out to allow the neutralisation is not 
met. The question remains however how often in practice will the full tax credit occur 
in bilateral tax treaties due to its negative impact on revenues of residence states.  
 
4.7. Emerging Markets95 
 
One of the latest decided cases that shed some light into the issue of neutralisation and 
the relationship between the source and resident State in the context of possible 
deductions or benefits was the Polish case decided on the 10th April 2014 which 
concerned the difference in treatment between dividends paid to resident and non-
resident investment funds, in particular the refusal to recognise and refund an 
overpayment of flat-rate corporation tax.  
 
In particular, the case involved investments located in Poland by a US investment fund 
that experienced withholding tax levied over dividends distributed from Poland (as they 
were not eligible to the income tax exemption which was firstly applicable to only 
Polish investment funds and later extended towards EU/EEA based funds). The US 
company applied for the refund claiming discriminatory treatment contrary to Art. 63 
TFEU (free movement of capital). Although Polish-American tax treaty was only 
invoked in the proceedings for the purpose of the exchange of information it is 
interesting that nevertheless the CJEU still raised the question about the applicability of 
neutralisation.  
 
One of the arguments provided focused on the possibility of accessing additional tax 
benefits in the state of residence which companies resident in Poland would not have 
the access to, however the Court rejected such statement based on the finding that 
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whenever the sole distinguishing criteria for taxation of distributed profits is the place 
of residence (which allows investment funds established in Poland to qualify 
automatically for the exemption) the assessment of whether the situations are 
comparable must be carried out only at the level of the investment vehicle.96 In such 
circumstances it is an obligation of a Member State to secure the equal treatment when 
exercising its power to tax and establishing a criteria for tax exemption. Therefore, “the 
argument put forward by the German Government, that the effects of a restriction may 
in general be nullified where an investor may, in his State of residence, attribute the tax 
to which the non-resident investment fund is subject at source to his personal tax 
liability or deduct that tax when the basis of the tax for which he is liable in his State of 
residence is determined, cannot be accepted”.97 
 
The wording used by the CJEU should perhaps receive additional attention. The usual 
meaning of ‘neutralisation’ has been replaced with the phrase ‘nullified effect’ which 
not necessarily represents the same conceptual characteristics. According to the Oxford 
Dictionary “to nullify” means “to make legally null and void or to invalidate”.98 It is 
rather evident that the meaning behind so far used concept of neutralisation differs 
significantly from nullification in terms of effect over the non-discriminatory principle. 
As it was emphasised by various AGs (and which is also argued in this work) one of the 
reasons for allowing the application of neutralisation was to compensate for the effects 
that discrimination could have created, but it did not remove the discrimination per se. 
However it is important to notice that in the Polish version of the case (which is the 
language the case was presented) the word actually occurring is “neutralizacja” which 
corresponds to the English word neutralisation and not nullification (similar situation 
occurs in the Swedish translation when the word “neutraliseras" is used).  
 
The case also reaffirms that the unilateral tax benefits cannot constitute a valid ground 
for neutralisation, which was earlier stated for instance in Eurowings case or Amurta. 
Only the mutual recognition of Member States’ obligations could possibly transfer the 
undertaken obligations under the Tax Treaty. The latest developments seem to confirm 
the shift from the struck approach initially started by cases such as Avior Fiscal or Saint 
Gobain. 
 
 
5. The question of consistency 
 
Differences between the approach used for the tax treaty neutralisation and provisions 
provided in the domestic legislation vary - the former allows neutralisation under 
specified criteria while the latter still rejects the idea on the principal ground. One could 
ask whether there is enough argumentation to maintain such opposite stands for the 
concept that aims at achieving the exact same outcome of compensating for 
discrimination or perhaps whether it is time to provide a doctrinal distinction between 
those two as otherwise it might become more difficult to reconcile those two types of 
application of neutralisation.   
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If the emphasis is to be put on what the CJEU has been also focusing on, namely the 
need to include the factual situation of the taxpayer, then it could be argued that it 
should not matter at which end he or she receives compensation - whether it is secured 
“by a tax treaty, national law or on flipping a coin”99 - as long as the wrongdoing is 
undone it should be irrelevant by what means. The source state will remain responsible 
for discriminatory treatment in all situations as neutralisation can simply only 
compensate for the less advantageous circumstances. Moreover, if a Member State 
could ensure neutralisation for the difference of treatment by means of tax treaties it 
might provide different standard of treatment not only between Member States but even 
within a single Member State who concludes different treaties with various Member 
States, as currently EU lacks a multilateral tax treaty. Such position can introduce 
“equality in the box”100 - different standards of compliance depending on the 
circumstances, disintegrates legal certainty and legitimate expectations of the taxpayer 
with partial application (depending on the location).  
 
Although the case law does not state it clearly, it can be deducted that the domestic “opt 
in” provisions cannot ease the harm of discriminatory treatment as (following the Thin 
Cap GLO) the less favourable treatment should have been neutralised in every situation. 
Therefore it can also be assumed that if a tax treaty offers an optional compensatory 
treatment (i.e. is not granted automatically or is conditional) it would also not result in 
neutralisation of discrimination101 - it also raises the question what happens if any 
corresponding advantages are subject to scrutiny of tax authorities 
 
All questions raised call for a more detail clarification from the CJEU, however it can 
be expected that answers can only arrive when the suitable case will be referred by 
domestic courts of Member States as it is rather unlikely that the CJEU would evaluate 
on the issue without being given specific facts. 
 
6. Potential consequences 
 
As suggested, it would be beneficial for the taxpayer (and to tax authorities to certain 
extent) to receive more clarification on the matter of neutralisation. Since 2004 there 
has been an increasing number of cases that in some way were discussing the problem 
of neutralisation. It cannot be excluded that further evolution of this area would start 
developing relationship with other areas of tax law, for instance it might be required to 
consider neutralisation it the light of anti-abusive principle to avoid treaty shopping and 
creation of artificial arraignments purely for the purposes of obtaining tax benefits. It 
may once again bring the discussion back as to whether there is or whether there should 
be the MFN principle under EU law and how could that potentially affect treaty 
shopping when no other means of direct taxation harmonisation are available on the 
centralised level.  
 
So far Member States are not obliged to adapt their own tax systems to the systems of 
another EU member countries just to eliminate double taxation. As long as the tax rules 
are not discriminatory member states do not need to adapt tax benefits available in other 
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Member States.102 Accepting different standards under different tax treaties shifts EU 
further away from having a unilateral tax treaty (despite the efforts of CJEU to, for 
instance, encourage the full tax credit as a common measure to relief double taxation 
and therefore to harmonise the type of remedy available).  
 
After judgements in Denkavit and Amurta one can conclude that in relation to the 
taxation of “dividends a foreign tax credit agreed in a tax treaty and actually available in 
the residence state may neutralise taxes in the source state. However, the source state 
does not have the right to refrain from eliminating international economic double 
taxation caused by taxes levied in that country solely because the state of residence of 
the dividend recipient unilaterally has chosen to apply the credit method for the 
purposes of eliminating international double taxation”.103 
 
An interesting note can be given as to whether other forms of international agreements 
could possibly allow neutralisation as well if concluded on a similar basis to tax treaties. 
The SGI case104 in a limited scope discussed the position of arbitration conventions 
(though not specifically in the context of neutralisation but what type of obligation it 
creates between countries). Although the CJEU concluded in other cases that tax treaties 
have the capacity of shifting the obligations under the Treaty it has not been ruled out 
that other type of international agreements could fulfil the same function as long as they 
constitute a part of domestic legal order. 
 
 
7. Overall difficulties  
 
Although the concept of neutralisation still raises questions and the Court's position in 
not entirely settled, it is possible to conclude on some general remarks. Firstly, any 
potentially discriminatory measures are analysed in a type of seclusion, meaning that 
whether national law breaches EU obligations is a matter of the legal provision itself 
under the comparison mechanism. In that way, once the discrimination is found any 
additional benefits cannot remove the discrimination, but   can be capable under special 
circumstances to neutralise the less advantageous treatment.105 With time, the CJEU 
departed from the strict approach under which none of the hypothetical benefits could 
counterbalance the breach of fundamental freedoms and trigging the discrimination. 
Advantages however can have different source: either under national provision or 
resulting from tax treaties. It has been argued that purely domestic measures cannot 
offset disadvantages, but measures having bilateral character of a tax treaty on the other 
hand can be successfully applied, however subject to the examination by the national 
courts.106  It cannot be automatically assumed that any provision from the tax treaty can 
be successfully invoked in such manner: as provided by the case law it can only be 
possible when the full compensation is granted. A clear example can be seen by the 
evaluation of cases related to dividend taxation when the issue considers the problem of 
exemption or ordinary tax credit methods for avoiding double taxation. As seen in 
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Commission v Italy107 or Commission v Spain108, the ordinary tax credit cannot protect 
Member States from being in breach of non-discriminatory principle (as action for 
infringement can be initiated even if the danger is only hypothetical) due to the fact that 
ordinary tax credit agreed upon in bilateral tax agreements does not shift the 
responsibility in full to eliminate any discriminatory restriction between the source and 
the residence state, as such credit only aims to eliminate juridical double taxation rather 
than economical double taxation. 109  
 
Neutralisation, which is the final product of the application of tax treaties can save 
domestic provisions from being incompatible with EU law110 as the domestic provisions 
which are held discriminatory can only be applied in a limited manner to the extent that 
tax treaty comes into force. There has not yet been a clear clarification and comparison 
as to why it is a bilateral character of legal agreements rather than unilateral instrument 
of granting advantages is the preferable method of allowing neutralisation and setting 
off the disadvantageous treatment. One of the suggested justifications for such approach 
is the argument for securing legal certainty for taxpayers which occurs under bilateral 
agreements.111 
 
The difference between unilateral and bilateral character of granting advantages and in 
turn securing the neutralisation of discrimination also goes in accordance with the 
overall approach used by CJEU. The position of a taxpayer is then considered in the 
light of all factors influencing his situation (therefore taking into account both the 
source and the residence state condition), but then the neutralisation might only be 
allowed if the less favourable treatment is compensated in full and further, it also cannot 
be subject to optionality. That scenario is rather difficult to fulfil if the grant of 
advantages is dependant on the unilateral actions of a Member State (also the question 
of the reciprocity).112 Having the condition does not guarantee the removal of the 
disadvantage and therefore opens the risk of discrimination to remain uncompensated.  
As the number of variables abides considerable, it should not surprise that the CJEU is 
rather reluctant to adopt only one approach, universal to different scenarios. Thus, the 
general guidance being available, the factual analysis of individual details of the case 
will most probably continue to be within the power of domestic courts to decide. Within 
the tax treaty context there is a trend that the CJEU broaden the scope under which the 
national provisions are examined for the purpose of compatibility with EU law and non-
discriminatory principle.113 
 
Neutralisation takes mostly affirmative position only when considered by mean of 
bilateral tax treaties, so far the position for unilateral agreement (and obligations put 
over the home State versus the source state) are not settled with clarity, but as there are 
currently no unilateral agreements present, the position in unlikely to become clearer. 
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A very different decision and approach was provided by the EFTA court in the Fokus 
Bank case114, where the EFTA court decided that (see para 35-38) “as a general rule, 
unfavourable tax treatment contrary to a fundamental freedom cannot be justified by the 
existence of any tax advantages” (where the Court referred to cases of Avoir Fiscal and 
Saint-Gobain). Additionally, it was of no legal or factual significance whether the credit 
granted would be a full or an ordinary credit. Such position differs notable from the 
current approach adopted by the CJEU. The legal assessment, under which there is no 
relevance whether the home (residence) state grants any benefits115 could interrupt the 
consistency in interpretation of EU rules, however it has to be borne in mind that EFTA 
judgements are not binding over EU Member States,116 therefore the potential impact of 
the Fokus Bank case remains rather hypothetical as the CJEU has not directly referred 
to it either by means of confirmation or rejection. In academics writing nevertheless the 
case is put in a way of contrast to recent decisions made by the CJEU.117 
It appears that a general tendency in neutralisation cases are that yet the concept is not 
allowed on the national ground only by means of additional (and by a matter of choice 
only optional) provisions leading to a different method of taxation of non-residents, 
however in the cross-border context involving double tax convention neutralisation 
might be allowed under specific circumstances. Based on the existing case law a full tax 
credit implemented by a bilateral tax treaty might be sufficient to neutralise a restriction 
present in the tax regime of a source state. Unilateral application would make the 
neutralisation dependent on the treatment at the home state, which from the dogmatic 
perspective is not in accordance with the purpose of the EU law in general. For the 
current stage of development of the direct taxation and lack of greater harmonisation 
only bilateral full credit could lead to equal treatment in the domestic and foreign EU 
situation.118 As the CJEU also emphases the importance of the actual situation of the 
taxpayer, granting an ordinary tax credit would trigger each and every time the need to 
investigate the facts and possibility of neutralisation    
 
The rejection of the unilateral relief could be explained in the following manner: it 
would make source state compatibility dependent with tax system of another Member 
State and this would restrict the fiscal sovereignty and would require adjustments to 
fellow Member States.119 The advantage that overall approach used in tax treaties has 
the advantage as it secures the compensatory effects under voluntarily negotiated 
binding agreements as “it avoids an overt contradiction with the general prohibition of 
counterbalancing tax disadvantages with unrelated tax advantages in other 
jurisdictions”.120 It is worth to consider yet again the consistency (or the lack of it) in 
focusing on the real situation of the taxpayer. If hypothetically it was placed as the final 
requirement for allowing compensation then what if the unilateral grant of tax benefits 
compensates for discrimination?  Does it really matter by which means neutralisation is 
secured? Despite those doubts, the CJEU always do need to take also a legal framework 
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into consideration: the need of securing legal certainty and legitimate expectations is 
also of a high importance.  
 
 
8. Final remarks 
 
Recent cases confirm that the issue of non-discrimination and problems closely linked 
to it emerge across different Member States, neutralisation being one of them and 
challenged both by individuals and companies. As there is no fixed definition of 
discrimination its relativity depends on the model of comparison of treatment.121 
However recently also the provisions in tax treaties has been challenged in the light of 
compatibility with EU law. Neutralisation became an important concept as it allows to 
compensate for the less favourable treatment. It has to be remembered that one cannot 
put an equals sign between compensation and justification.  
 
It has to be noted that, based on the Amurta judgement,122 the neutralisation at the 
current stage is only possible under tax treaties as the argument of unilateral application 
of full tax credit has been rejected, and therefore Member States cannot automatically 
rely on such assumption to escape from their obligation to prevent double economic 
taxation. Some could see in this judgement also a negation of the ruling in the Fokus 
Bank case as it explicitly confirmed that in fact, Member State can transfer their 
obligations under the bilateral agreements. 
 
Although we are yet to observe the positive application of neutralisation the CJEU gave 
clear indicators that such situation should not be exploded from happening, however 
due to the amount of variable factors it is still for the domestic courts to decided 
whether requirements established on the European level are satisfied as under specific 
circumstances the application of double tax conventions allow the difference in 
treatment under national legislation to be compensated for.123 Case law is not consistent 
in the matter as to how methods of relieving from double taxation, at one point credit 
and exemption method should be considered equivalent when considering type of cases 
involving taxation of dividends and discriminatory tax regimes as credit method allows 
non-resident companies to treat foreign sourced and nationally sourced dividends as 
bearing the same tax burden124. But clearly for the purpose of consideration over 
neutralisation under tax treaty the full credit method takes the precedence over other 
forms of treatment.  
 
Christina Panayi suggests that the difference in treatment by the CJEU between tax 
credit granted unilaterally and that under a tax treaty results from the fact that the credit 
method under tax treaties forms a part of a national legal order relevant for the 
proceedings and is relevant for the interpretation given by the Court.125 From this it 
should also follow why neutralisation is not in itself a justification: it is presented under 
the coherence of the tax system, which needs to be considered as a overall examination 
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of rules constituting a tax regime presented in a Member State, including concluded tax 
treaties. However on the other hand if a tax credit is granted unilaterally it also should 
be a part of a domestic legislation that should be taken into account. What remains 
relevant is the relationship between the host and the home state and how they are bound 
by the existence of a tax treaty. Only to the extend that the tax credit available in the 
home state forms a part of the legal order in the host state becomes of relevance and 
only to the extend that it neutralises the discriminatory effect of the host state rules.126  
 
When considering the compatibility of the neutralisation concept with the EU principles 
one can conclude that neither alternative domestic provisions, nor double tax 
conventions can justify the restrictive measures over the Treaty’s fundamental freedoms 
and discriminatory treatment. It is only the established justification grounds such as 
cohesion of the tax system or the exercise of taxing powers, etc. Yet equally, the 
principles laid down by the DTC that are not incompatible with the Community rules 
should not be ignored when answering questions included in the preliminary ruling.127 
The overall approach, recently gaining more support from the CJEU decisions establish 
the broader perspective when interpreting how Member States exercise their power of 
taxation. The possibility of neutralisation of discrimination undoubtedly might 
encourage Member States to revise their tax treaties to coordinate common efforts on 
the way to harmonise tax systems while lacking the general harmonisation on the EU 
level. 
 
It should be noticed that the tax treaty neutralisation applies so far only for the 
withholding tax treatment, although some cases considered discriminatory disallowance 
of deduction and the possibility of neutralising with the credit in the home state128 but 
the CJEU did not consider evaluating such action. As for the domestic neutralisation the 
stand taken by the CJEU is far more restrictive and has not been successfully claimed.  
 
9. Conclusion 
This thesis aimed at conducting the analysis of the concept of neutralisation and focused 
on providing the explanatory theory of what neutralisation is and in what situations it is 
applicable, in order to answer the question whether neutralisation is compatible with EU 
law. To fulfil such aim the traditional legal method was used upon the study of the case 
law. It has been argued that the purpose of the concept is to provide compensation for 
the discriminatory treatment rather than to introduce the new method of justification and 
different arguments have been used to support such opinion.   
The investigation of case law proves the existence of two different approaches which 
the CJEU systematically develops and applies depending whether the situation concerns 
domestic ‘opt in’ provisions or tax treaties involvement. In relation to the legal question 
this work states that neutralisation is allowed mostly in circumstances involving less 
favourable treatment in the area of withholding taxation when tax treaties are taken into 
account, as according to the current CJEU’s approach, there is a direct link between 
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allowing neutralisation and the obligation that Member States take upon themselves 
when concluding tax treaties. Therefore it appears that at the current stage of 
development neutralisation is compatible with EU law in the above mentioned 
circumstances. Naturally, there are specific conditions that have to be met and, as this 
thesis indicates, the final decision as to the affirmative application of neutralisation 
depends on the national courts who conduct the factual analysis of the scope of 
compensation.  
A different answer can be however given to the scenario involving “opt in” provisions. 
This research shows that the CJEU so far has been rejecting the application of 
neutralisation in the domestic situation. One of the reasons for that is the approach 
applied by Member States who claimed neutralisation to serve the propose of 
justification. One cannot exclude a possibility that in the future if presented as a 
remedial automatic procedure it could be allowed. Nonetheless, these are only 
hypothesis and it is difficult to predict which direction the Court may apply in the 
future.  
The result therefore has been achieved in accordance to its initial aim, pointing out most 
relevant conditions and suggesting existing and forthcoming difficulties of the concept 
of neutralisation.  
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